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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
property" right, good against all the world except the United States Gov-
ernment. However, when the land is particularly suitable for the use to
which it is going to be put, and such use has been intended by the owner,
it would seem not only possible, but just, to draw a balance between the
theory of the dominant servitude, and the theory of fair market value, as
is done in an eminent domain proceeding of fast lands.46
Irrespective of the many opinions of "just compensation," the im-
portance of Rands is that it intended to eliminate doubt and to end the
lower courts' indecision on the question of fair market value for riparian
lands. The Court summarily dismissed Monongahela as a case "pri-
marily" one of estoppel; explained the supposed "inconsistency" of River
Rouge; and expressly overruled the distinction made in Chandler-Dunbar
which gave added value to the lock and canal site.
In view of the history of the cases concerning eminent domain pro-
ceedings for riparian lands, it seems that the later Courts have centered
not so much on the issue of what elements of value full and just com-
pensation encompasses, but when it is to be paid. If the riparian land
owner's right of access is taken, or if the land is "incidentally destroyed,"
compensation is not required. By construing the value of riparian lands
in eminent domain proceedings to "inure to it due to the flow of the
stream," full and just compensation is avoided, as United States v. Rands
illustrates.
Jean McGuinness
CORPORATIONS-PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL-Corporate Tort-The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit holds that the cor-
porate entity will be disregarded to hold a shareholder liable for a cor-
porate tort only where the tort claimant can prove that the corporation
was formed with a specific intent to escape personal liability for a specific
tort or class of torts.
Zubik v. Zubik & Sons, Inc., 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 88 S. Ct. 1183 (1968).
Plaintiffs in the instant case sustained injuries when barges owned by
defendant Charles Zubik, Sr. broke loose from their moorings in an ice
flow. The barges had been leased to defendant Zubik & Sons, Inc., a firm
in which Charles Zubik, Sr. was the principal shareholder. The United
States District Court entered multiple admiralty judgments totaling
$207,504 against Charles Zubik, Sr. and Zubik & Sons, Inc., a closely
held corporation which had assets of only $67,000.'
46. Supra, note 37 at 359.
1. 384 F.2d at 271.
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On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision that the barges had been negligently
tied to their moorings.2 However Judge Van Dusen, writing the unani-
mous opinion for the three judge Court of Appeals, overruled the District
Court's holding that Charles Zubik, Sr. was personally liable for the
injuries caused by the negligence of employees of Zubik & Sons, Inc. The
lower court had based such liability on two findings: (1) that Charles
Zubik, Sr. had actively participated in the commission of the tort3 by
being in the immediate area of the fleet of barges on the night that they
broke loose, and (2) that the corporate entity should be disregarded and
shareholders held personally liable since Zubik & Sons, Inc. was "nothing
more than the alter ego of the individual defendant [Charles Zubik,
Sr.].. . ."' Judge Van Dusen dismissed the first basis for the imposition
of personal liability by holding that mere presence in the immediate area
did not amount to sufficient participation in the commission of the acts of
negligence.' In rejecting the lower court's second basis for personal
liability Judge Van Dusen closely examined the relationship between
Charles Zubik, Sr. and Zubik & Sons, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the
corporation).
The District Court had based its alter ego determination on the follow-
ing findings: (1) the corporation had paid salary and rental fees due
Charles Zubik, Sr. to a corporate account and that the personal expenses
of Charles Zubik, Sr. were paid by the corporation out of this account,
(2) Charles Zubik, Sr. was the only officer of the corporation with the
power to sign checks in its behalf, (3) for a three year period the corpora-
tion had failed to hold any meetings, (4) Charles Zubik, Sr. orally leased
assets to the corporation, (5) Charles Zubik, Sr. loaned money to the
corporation, (6) the corporation kept the records and deeds of Charles
Zubik, Sr., (7) Charles Zubik, Sr. had the "last word" in corporate
affairs, and (8) Charles Zubik, Sr. had the same attorney and accountant
as the corporation.
On appeal Judge Van Dusen held that the above findings were not
sufficient to warrant a piercing of the corporate veil. In so holding he
relied on the principle that closely held corporations are not held to the
2. When barges drift loose from their moorings and cause damages through collision a
presumption of negligence arises. Swenson v. The Argonaut, 204 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1953).
The defendant must prove freedom from negligence or humanly unalterable circumstances
in order to escape liability. Swenson v. The Argonaut, supra, at 640; The Louisiana, 3 Wall
164 (1866) ; see, The Rob, 122 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1941).
3. The general rule is that an officer of a corporation who takes part in the commission
of a tort by corporation employees is personally liable. 3 FLETCHER CYc. CoRP. § 1137 (Perm.
Ed. Rev. 1965); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 845 (1940); see, Chester-Cambridge Bank and
Trust Co. v. Rhodes, 346 Pa. 427, 433, 31 A.2d 28 (1943).
4. 384 F.2d at 270.
.5. 384 F.2d at 275-76.
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same degree of formality as are the larger corporations6 and on evidence
in the record which indicated a distinct corporate existence: (1) Charles
Zubik, Sr.'s daughter could sign corporation checks by reason of a power
of attorney, (2) the corporation borrowed from others as well as Charles
Zubik, Sr., (3) the corporation had some assets of its own, (4) the fact
that the corporation kept Charles Zubik, Sr.'s records and deeds was
irrelevant because he could neither read nor write, and (5) as far as daily
operations of the corporation were concerned Charles Zubik, Sr. was not
the "last word," but only a spectator.
Judge Van Dusen distinguished the tort claimant from the corporate
creditor who seeks to have the corporate entity disregarded: "the contro-
versy in such [creditor] cases invariably involves some degree of reliance
by the plaintiff, contributing to the fraud or undue advantage or trick
accenting the injustice. But the injured tort claimant stands on a different
footing."7 It is obvious that a tort claimant has not relied on the
existence of a corporation. However it is submitted that it is deceiving
to reject the argument of the tort claimant on this basis, for while a
creditor at least has an opportunity to investigate the shareholder-
corporation relationship in a closely held firm, the tort claimant must
involuntarily accept this relationship.
Judge Van Dusen stated that there is a presumption in favor of recog-
nizing the existence of a corporation when its existence has been chal-
lenged.8 To rebut this presumption the plaintiff-appellee was required to
show that "fraud, illegality or injustice" would result unless the corporate
entity was disregarded as where the "recognition of the corporate entity
would defeat public policy or shield someone from liability for a crime." 9
The court indicated that "fraud, illegality, or injustice" would vary with
the type of case presented. In bankruptcy,10 taxation," and contract"
6. E.g., Chambers v. Beaver-Advance Corp., 392 Pa. 481, 492, 140 A.2d 808, 814 (1958);
Sharon Herald Co. v. Granger, 97 F. Supp. 297, 301 (W.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd on other grounds,
195 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1952); Trager v. Schwartz, 345 Mass. 653, 189 N.E.2d 509 (1963);
In re Sheridan's Petition, 226 F. Supp. 136, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Hellenic Lines, Limited v.
Winkler, 249 F. Supp. 771, 773-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
7. 384 F.2d at 273.
8. 384 F.2d at 270, note 2, quoting from Corylell v. Phipps, 128 F.2d 702, 704 (5th Cir.
1942), aff'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 406 (1943) ; In re Sheridan's Petition, 226 F. Supp.
136, 139, (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Erie Drug Company Case, 416 Pa. 41, 43, 204 A.2d 256 (1964).
The presumption arises to preserve the theory of corporate law, see Price Bar, Inc. Liquor
License Case, 203 Pa. Super. 481, 484, 201 A.2d 221 (1964) ; Gagnon v. Speback, 389 Pa. 17,
21, 131 A.2d 221 (1957) ; cf. Miller v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 119 F. Supp. 916, 917
(s.D.W.Va. 1960).
9. 384 F.2d at 272. See Great Oak Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Rosenheim, 341 Pa. 132, 19
A.2d 95 (1964); Feidum v. Mikes Cafe, Inc., 204 Pa. Super. 336, 204 A.2d 776, aff'd, 419
Pa. 607, 213 A.2d 638 (1965) (justice or public policy reasons destroy corporate veil).
10. E.g., New Colonial Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934); Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S.
410 (1932); United States v. Goldberg, 206 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd on other
grounds, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
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cases different standards of fraud would be applied in determining
whether to pierce the corporate veil. Where a plaintiff seeks to hold an
individual shareholder liable for a corporate tort, as in the instant case,
the court held that the plaintiff must show that the corporation was
created "with specific intent to escape liability for a specific tort or class
of torts. ... 13 (Emphasis added). If this can be shown then the court
will consider the intertwining of personal affairs with the operation of a
closely held corporation as additional reason for piercing the corporate
veil. However, the court did not discuss any specific factors which must
exist before the veil can be pierced in the case of a corporate tort, but
limited itself to a generalized statement of the rule in this area.
14
Pennsylvania courts have held parent corporations liable for torts of
their subsidiaries but have never held a shareholder personally liable for
a corporate tort.15 Consequently the court cited Mull v. Colt Co. 6 as an
example of the fraud and injustice that must be shown before an indi-
vidual defendant shareholder is liable. In Mull the plaintiff was permitted
to sue the principal shareholder of a taxicab corporation, the federal
district court holding that the corporate entity should be disregarded
since it violated a statute17 and defrauded the public. In the earlier case
of Mull v. Colt Co."5 the court suggested different standards exist where a
plaintiff attempts to pierce the corporate veil to reach a parent corpora-
tion than where one seeks to reach an individual shareholder. However,
in Walkovszky v. Carlton9 the New York Court of Appeals refused to
pierce the corporate veil where no violation of law was alleged despite the
11. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Winkler, 249 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see Zubik, note
15 at 384 F.2d 267, 273.
12. "The organization of a corporation for the avowed purpose of avoiding responsibility
does not of itself, however, justify disregard of the corporate entity." 1 FLETCHER CYC. CORP.
§ 41.2, (Perm. Ed. Rev. 1965) as cited by the court; see, In re Sheridan's Petition, 226 F.
Supp. 720, 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Elenkreig v. Siebrecht, 238 N.Y. 254, 144 N.E. 519, 34
A.L.R. 592 (1924).
13. 384 F.2d at 273.
14. "In the absence of extraordinary circumstances the court will not disregard the
corporate fiction and hold a stockholder liable for the torts of the corporation." Geller v.
Transamerica Corporation, 53 F. Supp. 625, 631 (D. Del. 1953).
15. In McCarthy v. Ference, 358 Pa. 485, 58 A.2d 49 (1948), where the parent corpora-
tion owned all the subsidiary's stock and both corporations had common directors, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the subsidiary was an instrumentality of the parent
and treated it as a department of the parent. See also, Whayne v. Transportation Manage-
ment Service Inc., 252 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Pa. 1966) where the plaintiff sued the subsidiary
and the parent under the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness doctrine.
16. 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), sustaining the amended complaint dismissed in
Mull v. Colt Co., 178 F. Supp. 720 (SD.N.Y. 1959).
17. In violation of NEw YORK CrrY POLICE REGISTRATION REGULATIONS, Mar. 26, 1953,
Section II A(1) and II D(5)(1). The purpose of the regulations was to assure the public
of safely maintained taxicabs. 31 F.R.D. 154, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
18. 178 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) dismissing the original complaint. Court discusses
different standards at 722.
19. 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
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fact that the assets of the corporation consisted of only two mortgaged
taxicabs covered by the legal minimum of insurance ($10,000 apiece) and
the defendant shareholder was also a shareholder in several other two
taxicab corporations. In Thoni Trucking Co. v. Foster0 the plaintiff
successfully sued the majority shareholder of a closely held corporation
whose truck had injured him. However in Thoni Trucking Co. the share-
holder defendant had stripped the corporation of all its assets immedi-
ately following the accident."
Judge Van Dusen in Zubik stated that the corporate veil will be
pierced in the case of a corporate tort only when the corporation was
formed with the specific intent to escape liability for a specific tort or
class of torts,2 but also indicated that a specific intent to escape personal
liability is a primary motive for incorporation and is not alone a sufficient
basis for piercing the corporate veil.2" Thus the plaintiff has a heavy
burden: he is virtually required to prove a criminal motive behind the
decision to incorporate before the entity will be disregarded. As a result
of similar reasoning by other courts shareholders of a closely held real
estate, 24 entertainment, 25 manufacturing,26 and shipping27 corporations
with negligible assets can successfully avoid personal liability for corpo-
rate torts and the tort victim must bear the burden of his loss.
One suggested remedy28 to this problem is enacting a special statute for
closely held corporations eliminating the no personal liability feature of
the entity. This solution might impede investment, thus curtailing eco-
nomic growth, and requires an explicit definition of a closely held corpora-
20. 243 F.2d 570 (1957).
21. In an appropriate case where the stockholder owns all the stock and the corporation
is treated as an instrumentality, the corporate entity will be disregarded. Great Oak Bldg.
& Loan Assn. v. Rosenheim 341 Pa. 132, 19 A.2d 95 (1964) ; "where one corporation controls
another, and uses it as the means, agency and instrumentality by which the former carries
out and performs its business, it is liable for the torts of the latter." Mangan v. Terminal
Transport System, 157 Misc. 627, 631, 284 N.Y.S. 183, 188 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 247 App.
Div. 853, 286 N.Y.S. 666 (3d Dept. 1936); one commentator states that the rules used to
pierce the corporate veil are result orientated. E. LATrY, SuasmiAnlEs AND AFFILIATED COR-
PORATIONS 191 (1936).
22. See note 13, supra.
23. See note 12, supra. In Werner v. Hearst, 177 N.Y. 63, 67, 69 N.E. 221, 222 (1903),
the court indicated that no inquiry will be made as to whether the corporation was formed in
good faith or was an "evasive device" to escape individual responsibility.
24. Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N.Y. 254, 144 N.E. 519 (1924).
25. Banks v. Jones, 239 Ark. 386, 390 So. 2d 108 (1965).
26. Petrovich v. Felco Chem. Corp., 194 Misc. 111, 86 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
27. In re Sheridan, 226 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y., 1964).
28. Whiter, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law," 28 CORNELL L.Q. 313
(1943). There is no special incorporation statute for close corporations. Symposium on the
Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 345 (1957); see Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d
414, 420, 223 N.E.2d 6, 10, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 590 (1966) for the formalities necessary for
larger corporations.
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tion.29 Another proposal" suggests mandatory insurance coverage for all
corporations which can be waived only upon showing of sufficient capital-
ization. Since the Zubik case involves maritime law there is a third pos-
sible remedy. The historic purpose of maritime laws is to preserve and
protect maritime shipping and commercial interests. The Zubik decision
jeopardizes these interests by permitting individuals to operate thinly
capitalized corporations on our waters free from any risk of personal
liability. In order to protect and perpetuate these interests the maritime
tort claimant should not have to bear the heavy burden of proof required
by Zubik before the corporate entity will be disregarded. It is submitted
that the Zubik court did not give adequate consideration to the protective
purposes of maritime law.
Salvatore J. Cucinotta
TRUSTS-PURPOSE CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLIcY-The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court clarifies and updates its views on the validity of marriage
and re-marriage conditions which are annexed to a testamentary trust,
relating to the religion and national origin of the spouse of a beneficiary.
In re Estate of Keffalas, 426 Pa. 432, 233 A.2d 248 (1967).
John Keffalas died testate on April 19, 1956. His last Will and Testament,
dated December 8, 1944, was admitted to probate on May 1, 1956. The
relevant paragraphs in the will are as follows:
"Fourth: To my daughter, Dorothy J. Keffalas Gregory, I give one-
hundred dollars.... Should my daughter Dorothy either by divorice [sic]
or death remarry a man of true Greek blood and descent and of Orthodox
religion, . . .she shall after one year of successful marriage receive the
sum of two-thousand ($2,000) from my trust funds."' [Dorothy had
married a non-Greek prior to execution of the will].
Fifth through Eleventh: A conditional bequest to each child but
Dorothy of $2,000.00, on condition that such child marry a person of
"true Greek blood and descent and of Orthodox religion."'
Twelfth and Thirteenth: Disposed of testator's business to his three
eldest sons, upon the same condition.
29. The Pennsylvania Senate has passed a new Business Corporation Law where the
close corporation is defined to consist of 30 or less stock holders. Senate Bill No. 1169 (1967):
Chap. B, Art. III, Sec. 1(4).
30. Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts oj Their Corporations,
76 YALE L.J. 1190 (1967).
1. In re Estate of Keffalas, 426 Pa. 432, 434, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (1967).
2. Id.
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